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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated excellent
performance on various tasks, however they are under the risk of ad-
versarial examples that can be easily generated when the target model
is accessible to an attacker (white-box setting). As plenty of machine
learning models have been deployed via online services that only pro-
vide query outputs from inaccessible models (e.g., Google Cloud Vision
API2), black-box adversarial attacks (inaccessible target model) are of
critical security concerns in practice rather than white-box ones. How-
ever, existing query-based black-box adversarial attacks often require
excessive model queries to maintain a high attack success rate. There-
fore, in order to improve query efficiency, we explore the distribution
of adversarial examples around benign inputs with the help of image
structure information characterized by a Neural Process, and propose a
Neural Process based black-box adversarial attack (NP-Attack) in this
paper. Extensive experiments show that NP-Attack could greatly de-
crease the query counts under the black-box setting. Code is available at
https://github.com/Sandy-Zeng/NPAttack.
Keywords: Black-box Adversarial Attack, Adversarial Distribution, Query
Efficiency, Neural Process
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been deployed on many real-world complex
tasks and demonstrated excellent performance, such as computer vision [12],
speech recognition [28], and natural language processing [7]. However, DNNs are
found vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., DNNs will make incorrect pre-
dictions confidently when inputs are added with some well designed impercep-
tible perturbations [11], thus various adversarial defense methods are proposed
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† Corresponding authors: Yisen Wang (eewangyisen@gmail.com) and Yong Jiang
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[2,29,30]. Adversarial examples can be crafted following either a white-box set-
ting (the adversary has full access to the target model) or a black-box setting
(the adversary has no information of the target model). White-box methods such
as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11], Projected Gradient Decent (PGD)
[21], Carlini & Wagner (CW) [3] and other universal attacks [23,19] only pose
limited threats to DNN models which are usually kept secret in practice. Mean-
while transferability-based black-box attacks, e.g., momentum boosting [8] and
skip gradient [33], need to train a surrogate model separately and only obtain a
moderate attack success rate.
As modern machine learning systems, e.g., Google Cloud Vision API2 (https:
//cloud.google.com/vision/) and Google Photos3 (https://photos.google.
com/), are often provided as a kind of service, one common scenario is that we can
query the system in a number of times and get the output results [1]. Based on
this, query-based black-box attacks that directly generate adversarial examples
on the target model are proposed such as ZOO [4]. These query-based meth-
ods could bring almost 100% attack success rates while their query complexity
is quite high (not acceptable). Therefore, how to significantly reduce the query
complexity while maintaining the attack success rate simultaneously is still an
open problem. There are several existing work to reduce the query complex-
ity. For examples, AutoZOOM [26] compresses the attack dimension while QL
[13] adopts an efficient gradient estimation strategy. Different from the above
example-wise adversarial example generation, NAttack [18] proposes to model
the adversarial distribution and sample from it to generate adversarial examples,
which indeed reduces the query counts. However, the distribution is based on
the simple pixel-wise mapping functions (e.g., tanh), which is the bottleneck of
its query complexity.
Inspired by the above observations, in this paper, we introduce the structure
information of the image into consideration to further reduce the required query
counts when modeling the distribution of adversarial examples. To be specific,
the structure is characterized by a Neural Process (NP) [10], an efficient auto-
encoder method to model a distribution over regression functions with a deter-
ministic variable focusing on local information and a latent variable focusing on
global information. Based on NP, we then propose a Neural Process based black-
box attack, named NP-Attack. NP can be pre-trained on benign examples, and
then used to reconstruct adversarial examples through optimizing above men-
tioned variables, which is definitely efficient than previous pixel-wise operations
in NAttack. As a proof-of-concept, we conduct an experiment to compare these
two distribution-based attacks: NAttack and NP-Attack. Both attacks are con-
ducted by limiting the same maximal query count, and the maximal distortion
of L∞ is set to 0.05 for CIFAR10 and 0.2 for MNIST. The percentage of ad-
versarial examples returned at the maximal query count is plotted in Figure 1.
We can see that the adversarial distribution optimized in NP-Attack (three vari-
ants) contains a higher percentage of adversarial examples under the same query
counts compared to NAttack, which illustrates NP-Attack is more efficient in
optimizing and modeling the adversarial distributions. Figure 1 also gives some
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Fig. 1. Comparison of two distribution-based black-box attacks: NAttack and our
proposed NP-Attack. Percentage of adversarial examples with different query counts
generated by NAttack and NP-Attack on MNIST (a) and CIFAR10 (b), and the cor-
responding NP-Attack generated adversarial examples and benign examples of MNIST
(c) and CIFAR10 (d). It is demonstrated that NP-Attack is more query efficient com-
pared to NAttack when generating adversarial examples.
examples of adversarial examples generated in our NP-Attack, which are also
visual integrity. Our main contributions could be summarized as follows:
– We propose a distribution based black-box attack, Neural Process based
black-box attack (NP-Attack), which uses the image structure information
for modeling adversarial distributions and reduces the required query counts.
– NP-Attack has several optimization variants due to the variables in NP. The
optimization on deterministic variable focuses more on the local information,
while optimization on latent variable focuses more on the global information.
The different optimization variants have different effects on the location of
adversarial perturbations, which brings more flexibility for NP-Attack.
– Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our proposed NP-
Attack. On both untargeted and targeted attacks, NP-Attack greatly reduces
the needed query counts under the same attack success rate and distortion,
compared with the state-of-the-art query-based black-box attacks.
2 Related Work
Existing black-box attacks can be categorized into two groups: 1) transferability-
based method that transfers from attacking a surrogate model; and 2) query-
based method that directly generates adversarial examples on the target model.
For transferability-based black-box attacks, adversarial examples are crafted
on a surrogate model then applied to attack the target model. There are sev-
eral techniques to improve the transferability of black-box attacks. For example,
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Momentum Iterative boosting (MI) [8] incorporates a momentum term into the
gradient to boost the transferability. Diverse Input (DI) [34] proposes to craft
adversarial examples using gradient with respect to the randomly-transformed
input example. Skip Gradient Method (SGM) [33] uses more gradients from the
skip connections rather than the residual modules via a decay factor to craft
adversarial examples with high transferability. However, they usually cannot ob-
tain the 100% attack success rate, which is closely restricted by the dependency
between the surrogate model and the target model.
For query-based black-box attacks, they could be further classified as decision-
based (query results are one-hot labels) [5] or score-based ones (query results
are scores). The score-based attacks are investigated in this paper. This kind
of method estimates the gradient of the target model via a large number of
queries, which is then used to generate adversarial examples. ZOO [4] explores
gradient estimation methods by querying the target model as an oracle. They
use zeroth-order stochastic coordinate descent along with dimension reduction,
hierarchical attack and importance sampling techniques, to directly estimate
the gradients of the targeted model for generating adversarial examples. How-
ever, ZOO requires numerous queries to estimate the gradients with respect to
all pixels. Further, AutoZOOM [26] operates the gradient estimation in latent
space, using an offline pre-trained auto-encoder or a bilinear mapping function
to compress the attack dimension. It then applies an adaptive random gradient
estimation strategy to balance query counts and distortion, which improves the
query efficiency by a great deal. Meta Attack [9] pre-trains a meta attacker model
to estimate the black-box gradient, which efficiently reduces the query counts.
Beyond zeroth-order optimization-based approaches, QL [13] proposes to use a
Natural Evolution Strategy (NES) [31] to enhance query efficiency. Bandits [14]
further introduces time and data priors under NES. NAttack [18] is another
kind of black-box attack that explicitly models the adversarial distribution with
a Gaussian distribution. The adversarial attack is hence formalized as an opti-
mization problem, which searches the Gaussian distribution under the guidance
of increasing the attack success rate of target models.
Following the general NES structure, we explore the adversarial distribution
in a more efficient way using some high-level information of images in this paper.
3 Proposed Neural Process-based Black-box Attack
In this section, we propose a Neural Process-based Black-box Attack (NP-Attack)
with significantly reduced query counts. NP-Attack models the distribution of
adversarial examples efficiently by a Neural Process that utilizes the high-level
structure information of images rather than the pixel-level information.
3.1 Preliminaries of Neural Process
Neural Process (NP) [10] is a combination of the best from neural networks
and Gaussian Process [22,32], which could efficiently estimate the uncertainty in
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Fig. 2. The structure of NP model trained on pixels of one image. Here, VC and VT
are the context and target pixel values, then PC and PT are the corresponding pixel
positions. zi and ri are pixel-wise latent variables and deterministic variables.
the predictions. It could be expanded into an attentive version, called Attentive
Neural Process (ANP) [15,27], which is applied in our NP-Attack§.
As pixel values in one image subject to a Gaussian Process, NP is applied to
reconstruct images by predicting their pixel values. As shown in Figure 2, the
structure of NP consists of the following three parts: 1) Encoder h, whose inputs
are context pixel pairs concatenating pixel positions and values; 2) Aggregator a,
which summarizes the outputs of the encoder as latent variable z from a Gaussian
distribution N (µ, σ2) and deterministic variable r; 3) Decoder g, which takes
the sampled latent variable z, deterministic variable r and target pixel position
PT as inputs and predicts the target pixel value VT . Overall, NP models the
distributions as:
p
(
VT
∣∣∣∣PC , PT , VC )= ∫ p (VT |PT , r, z )q (z|sC )dz, (1)
Here P , V represents pixel position and value, and C, T are random subsets
of context and target, sC is the distribution modeled over (PC , VC). In Eq. 1,
Latent variable z accounts for uncertainty in the predictions of VT for observed
(PC , VC), while r is calculated by a deterministic function which aggregates
(PC , VC) into a finite dimensional representation with permutation invariance
in C. The interpretation of the latent path is that z gives rise to correlations
in the marginal distribution of the target predictions VT , modeling the global
structure of the stochastic process realization, whereas the deterministic path r
models the fine-grained local structure.
3.2 Pre-training of Neural Process
The NP model in NP-Attack is pre-trained on the pixels of given benign images
by maximizing the following Evidence Lower Bound (ELBO)¶:
log p (VT |PT , PC , VC ) ≥ E q(z| sT ) [log p (VT |PT , r, z) ]−DKL (q (z|sT )‖q (z|sC )) .
(2)
§ We still use NP in the following without ambiguity
¶ The implementation details of ANP are shown in the Appendix A
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Like sC defined above, sT represents the distribution modeled over (PT , VT ). To
be specific, the sC and sT are both the whole pixels in one image during the
pre-training process in NP-Attack. Once trained, NP shares the same encoder
and decoder on the same image set even on different selected images, varying on
latent variables and deterministic variables corresponding to different images.
Note that such pre-training process is independent from the main attack part
on the benign examples, which means the encoder and decoder are fixed after
pre-training and could keep some structure information of images.
The pre-trained NP models a distribution by variables z and r, where z is
sampled from a Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ2), thus the latent variables and
deterministic variable are in fact (µ, σ) and r. As NP models the pixel-wise dis-
tribution in one image, its structure information is kept in such NP. Adversarial
examples and benign examples are imperceptible to human eyes, sharing a simi-
lar visual structure. Thus we utilize the pre-trained NP and find that adversarial
examples could be reconstructed successfully by optimizing the above mentioned
variables for a new distribution and sampling from this optimized distribution.
3.3 Overview of the Proposed NP-Attack
Equipped with the pre-trained NP, we can propose the distribution-based NP-
Attack. The key idea of distribution-based attack is to model the adversarial
distribution around the small region of one natural example x, such that a sam-
ple drawn from this distribution is likely an adversarial example. Compared to
previous distribution-based NAttack, the difference lies on the method of mod-
eling the adversarial distribution. NAttack models such adversarial distribution
just on pixel level with a Gaussian distribution focusing on pixels independently,
not considering any other information on the structure of pixel values in one im-
age. However, our proposed NP-Attack utilizes the decoder of a pre-trained NP
model and only optimizes latent variables or deterministic variables, in which
case the fixed decoder could hold some structure information of pixels in one im-
age, improving the optimization efficiency in modeling adversarial distributions.
Specifically, the objective function L in our NP-Attack is defined on S, an
intersection of a latent region modeled by NP and a Lp-ball centered around
the benign example x, i.e., S = Sp(x)
⋂
NP(x). Given l as the loss defined on a
given example point, the objective L with regard to adversarial distribution in
our optimization criterion is:
L((µ, σ), r|x) :=
∫ x+
x−
l(xrec)g(xrec|(µ, σ), r)h((µ, σ), r|x)dxrec (3)
where g and h are the decoder and encoder of pre-trained NP, µ, σ, r denote for
the variables to be optimized in NP-Attack, xrec denotes the image reconstructed
by NP,  denotes the Lp ball restriction. By optimizing on such objective L, we
could achieve our aim to model the latent manifold of adversarial examples.
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As the target model could return scores in each query, the original loss func-
tion is defined as:
l(x) :=

max(0,max
c 6=y
logF (x)c − logF (x)y), targeted,
max(0, logF (x)y −max
c 6=y
logF (x)c), untargeted.
(4)
where F (x) denotes the softmax outputs, y is the true label in untargeted attack
or the target label in targeted attack, and c is other labels except y.
In summary, the procedures on modeling and sampling from distribution in
NP-Attack are shown in Algorithm 1: 1) Feed a benign example x, and compute
r and (µ, σ) from the Encoder h of NP; 2) Sample z from N (µ, σ2); and 3)
Reconstruct xrec with the optimized (r, z) from the Decoder g of NP (shown in
the following Section 3.4), then project xrec back into the Lp-ball centered at x.
3.4 Optimization of NP-Attack
As the reconstructed image xrec is mainly dependent on the sampled r, z and
pre-trained Decoder g of NP, there are three optimization options: NP-Attack-
R/Z/RZ corresponding to the optimized variables r, z or both. As the three
branches share the similar optimization function, we take NP-Attack-R as an
example here, and other optimization options are shown in the Appendix B.
In this case, r is a variable in NP, cooperating with z to reconstruct an
image. The difference of r from z is that r is a deterministic variable. That is, z
shares the same distribution in one image for all pixels, while r is independent
for different pixels thus with better freedom. As adversarial perturbations are
computed and added on pixels, the optimization on r might be more reasonable.
The benefit of optimizing r than NAttack is that r is in the latent space with a
larger latent dimension (128 dimension in our NP-Attack) for each pixel, which
owns more capacity to perturb.
We define the loss L on some search distribution Π(R | r). Omitting z while
inheriting Decoder g from the pre-trained NP, the estimated loss function in
our NP-Attack could be considered as: L = EΠ(R|r)l(g(R)). To simplify the
optimization, we give R ∼ N (r, σ′2), where σ′ is a hyper-parameter. Then the
optimization of r could be implemented by adding some random Gaussian noises
and using NES. The optimization function could be computed as:
rt+1 ← rt − η
b
b∑
i=1
l(g(Ri))∇rt logN (Ri | rt, σ′2), (5)
where b is the batch size. Given that Ri = rt + piσ
′, where pi is sampled from
the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, I), and σ′ is a hyper-parameter, not
essentially equal to σ in z, ∇rt logN (Ri | rt, σ′2) ∝ σ′−1pi.
3.5 Discussion
As the adversarial examples in our NP-Attack is sampled and reconstructed
through the decoder of the benign pre-trained NP, we study on the examples
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Algorithm 1 NP-Attack
Input: natural image x, label y, target neural network F , pre-trained NP model (En-
coder h, Decoder g, Aggregator a), maximal optimization iteration T , sample size
b, projecting function P , learning rate η
1: Compute the variables from Encoder h on image x: N (µ, σ2), r ← h(x)
2: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
3: if F(x) 6= y (untargeted) or F(x) = y (targeted) then
4: attack success.
5: else
6: Sample perturbations from Gaussian distribution: pi ∼ N (0, I), i = 1, 2, ..., b.
7: Add the perturbation pi in NP-Attack-R/Z/RZ, specifically on µ or r or both,
zi ∼ N (µ, σ2), ri = r + piσ, NP-Attack-R,
zi ∼ N (µ+ piσ, σ2), ri = r, NP-Attack-Z,
zi ∼ N (µ+ piσ, σ2), ri = r + piσ, NP-Attack-RZ.
8: Reconstruct the image from Decoder g, and use project function P to restrict
its maximal distortion: xi = P (g(zi, ri)).
9: Compute the losses of these reconstructed image series xi under targeted or
untargeted setting,
li =

max(0,max
c 6=y
logF (xi)c − logF (xi)y), targeted,
max(0, logF (xi)y −max
c 6=y
logF (xi)c), untargeted.
The corresponding loss li = li −mean(l).
10: Update µ or r or both as optimization:
rt+1 ← rt − η
bσ
b∑
i=1
lipi, NP-Attack-R,
µt+1 ← µt − η
bσ
b∑
i=1
lipi, NP-Attack-Z,
µt+1 ← µt − η
bσ
b∑
i=1
lipi, rt+1 ← rt − η
bσ
b∑
i=1
lipi, NP-Attack-RZ.
11: end if
12: end for
reconstructed by NP. Figure 3 shows that the adversarial examples and benign
ones could both be reconstructed by benign pre-trained NP, sharing the same
decoder, optimized with different latent variables. However, noised examples
(added with slight Gaussian noises) could absolutely not be reconstructed by
such NP. This phenomenon contributes to the query efficiency of NP-Attack
compared to NAttack, as the appliance of NP filters the noised examples away,
the distributions modeled by NP are with higher percentages of adversarial ex-
amples, which keep consistency with the Figure 1.
Moreover, we discuss the difference between NP and other auto-encoder mod-
els, like VAE [16]. Note that the variables in NP are different from VAE. In VAE,
the latent variable z is on the whole image set, which means a different sample
would refer to the reconstruction of a different image. In NP, the distribution
Improving Query Efficiency of Black-box Adversarial Attack 9
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Fig. 3. The reconstruction of pre-trained NP. Given noise examples with random Gaus-
sian noises (a) and adversarial examples generated by PGD attack (b) under L∞ = 0.2
as the input of the benign pre-trained NP model, the adversarial examples could be
reconstructed while noised examples could not.
of z is modeled independently on one image. So the optimization of z in VAE
to model adversarial distribution could lead to a collapse on distributions with
high possibility. On the contrary, the Gaussian distribution of z in NP could be
optimized independently on different images towards adversarial distribution.
Moreover, NP has another variable r, which is also modeled on one image and
different from z, bringing more flexibility.
4 Experiment
In this section, we evaluate our method on three benchmark image classification
datasets MNIST [20], CIFAR10 [17] and ImageNet [6]. We compare our proposed
NP-Attack with several score-based black-box attack techniques with regard to
distortion (), average query count (i.e. the number of evaluations on black-
box model) and attack success rate (ASR). We firstly provide a comprehensive
understanding of NP-Attack where we test the performance of our NP-Attack
under different experimental settings. After that, we conduct untargeted and
targeted attacks on benchmark datasets MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet to
show the superiority of our method in reducing query counts.
Experimental Setups For MNIST, a MLP model is trained with three
fully connected layers, achieving 98.50% accuracy. For CIFAR10, the WideRes-
Net [35] is adopted, achieving 94.10% accuracy. For ImageNet, we use the pre-
trained Inception-V3 model [25], achieving 78% accuracy. The baseline query
based black-box techniques are ZOO [4], AutoZOOM [26], QL [13] and NAttack
[18]. The results of those compared methods are reproduced by the code released
in the original paper with default settings.
NP Pre-training For NP-Attack, NP models are pre-trained on the train
set of MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet respectively which takes around 5, 45 and
72 hours on a single NVIDIA GTX 1080 TI GPU. The dimensions of r and z are
both 128. Regarding the computational overhead of the pre-training, we would
like to point out that the pre-training of NP is over the whole dataset while the
black-box attack is performed on a single image per time. The pre-trained model
is used for free to perform black-box attack, when the pre-training is complete.
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Thus, the pre-training is a off-line operation, which is totally separated from
the on-line black-box attack. The overhead of pre-training will not affect the
black-box attack phase.
4.1 Empirical Understanding of NP-Attack
We evaluate the performance of NP-Attack under different experimental settings,
including various sample sizes, maximum distortion, and optimization methods
(optimizing r, z or both). Experiments are conducted on MNIST with 200 cor-
rectly classified images selected from the test set.
Optimization Method We first investigate the performance of our NP-
Attack with different optimization methods, i.e., optimizing over the variable
r, z or both. The experimental results are summarized in Table 1. The L∞
distortion is set to 0.2 for MNIST and 0.05 for CIFAR10. Optimizing r is more
query efficient, for the reason that r is modeled independent for different pixels
in NP while z is modeled as a same Gaussian distribution over all pixels in one
image. NP-Attack-R and NP-Attack-Z show the upper and lower bound of our
NP based attack. The adversarial examples generated by different optimization
methods are shown in Appendix C.
Table 1. Evaluation of NP-Attack under untargeted setting by optimizing the variables
r, z or both on 200 correctly classified images from MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Attack Method
MNIST CIFAR10
ASR L2 Dist Query Count ASR L2 Dist Query Count
NP-Attack-R 100% 3.07 1,190 100% 1.75 96
NP-Attack-Z 100% 3.55 1,665 100% 1.68 150
NP-Attack-RZ 100% 3.65 1,460 100% 1.80 98
Sample Size We test the sample size b ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} and set the L∞
distortion to 0.2. Noted that query count is linearly related to sample size, as
Q = T × b, where T represents iteration count and Q represents query count.
The changes of ASR with the maximal query count are plotted in Figure 4(a).
It shows that our NP-Attack could achieve over 90% ASR with different sample
sizes when the maximal query count is larger than 7000. The ASR, L2 distortion
and average query count when the maximal query count is 7000 are reported in
Table 2. We can see that, with a larger sample size, the iteration T is reduced
along with larger average query counts. However, we can get higher ASRs and
smaller L2 distortion by increasing the sample size, illustrating a more accurate
estimation of the perturbation direction.
Maximal Distortion It is a trade-off between the distortion and query
counts in black-box attack. We set the sample size b = 10 and test the L∞
distortion  ∈ {0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30}. The change of ASRs with various
Improving Query Efficiency of Black-box Adversarial Attack 11
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Fig. 4. Change of ASRs when limiting the query counts on MNIST with NP-Attack-R.
(a) Different curves represent performance under different sample sizes. (b) Different
curves represent restricting different maximal distortion.
Table 2. Evaluation of NP-Attack-R under untargeted setting on MNIST with different
sample sizes. The maximal query count is 7000 and L∞ distortion is restricted to 0.2.
Sample Size (b) Iteration Nums (T) ASR L2 Dist Avg Query Count
10 700 98.01% 4.3707 723
20 350 98.51% 3.9478 786
30 233 99.00% 3.6675 940
40 175 99.00% 3.4675 1,074
50 140 99.00% 3.3277 1,203
maximal query counts is shown in Figure 4(b). When  = 0.3, our NP-Attack
achieves 98% ASR with only 1000 maximal query counts. With the 5000 query
counts, NP-Attack can achieve nearly 100% ASR when L∞ is larger than 0.2.
4.2 Evaluation on MNIST and CIFAR10
For both MNIST and CIFAR10, we randomly select 1000 correctly classified
images from the test set for untargeted attack. For targeted attack, 100 correctly
classified images are selected from test set, for each image the target labels are set
to the other 9 classes and a total 900 attacks are performed. In our experiments,
the L∞ distortion is restricted to 0.2 for MNIST and 0.05 for CIFAR10 following
the setting of [14]. For untargeted attack, the maximal iteration is T = 900 and
sample size is b = 30 while for targeted attack T = 2000, b = 50. The learning
rate is η = 0.01 in default setting. A total query count is obtained by multiplying
the number of iterations and the query count per iteration.
Note that the query count per iteration varies in different black-box attack
techniques. ZOO uses the parallel coordinate-wise estimation with a batch of 128
pixels, resulting in 256 query counts per iteration. In AutoZOOM, the attack
stages could be divided into initial attack success and post-success fine-tuning.
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Table 3. Adversarial evaluation of black-box attacks on MNIST.
Attack Method
Untargeted Attack Targeted Attack
ASR L2 L∞ Query Count ASR L2 L∞ Query Count
ZOO 100% 1.12 0.21 107,264 100% 1.64 0.29 128,768
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 100% 2.01 0.50 9,129 99.89% 2.78 0.62 9,401
AutoZOOM-AE 100% 2.62 0.67 10,202 99.89% 3.74 0.87 10,380
QL 96.62% 3.38 0.20 2,549 99.67% 3.09 0.20 2,693
NAttack 95.09% 2.14 0.20 4,357 98.22% 3.33 0.20 5,981
NP-Attack-R(Ours) 100% 3.09 0.20 1,226 100% 3.72 0.20 2,693
NP-Attack-Z(Ours) 99.90% 3.55 0.20 1,680 100% 3.94 0.20 2,605
Table 4. Adversarial evaluation of black-box attacks on CIFAR10.
Attack Method
Untargeted Attack Targeted Attack
ASR L2 L∞ Query Count ASR L2 L∞ Query Count
ZOO 100% 0.12 0.02 208,384 99.52% 0.19 0.02 230,912
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 100% 1.56 0.15 8,113 100% 2.13 0.21 8,266
AutoZOOM-AE 100% 1.88 0.16 7,113 100% 2.78 0.24 8,217
QL 98.40% 1.91 0.05 857 99.55% 2.11 0.05 616
NAttack 99.89% 2.61 0.05 183 100% 2.61 0.05 1,151
NP-Attack-R(Ours) 100% 1.74 0.05 94 100% 1.85 0.05 589
NP-Attack-Z(Ours) 100% 1.67 0.05 144 100% 1.78 0.05 936
In each iteration, the number of random vector is set to 1 at the first stage to find
the initial attack success examples and then set to q at the second stage to reduce
the distortion at the same level with other techniques. Thus the query count for
AutoZOOM is q + 1 per iteration. For QL, NAttack and our NP-Attack, query
count in each iteration is the sample size b. For a fair comparison, we set the
same sample size for these three NES algorithm based methods. Besides, both
ZOO and AutoZOOM are optimization-based methods which quickly attack the
model successfully and generate adversarial examples with quite large distortion
and continuously perform post-success fine-tuning to reduce the distortion. We
report the final fine-tuning query count and the distortion after fine-tuning for
ZOO and AutoZOOM.
The experimental results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. We report the ASRs,
L2 distortion, L∞ distortion and average query counts. As mentioned in Section
4.1, performance of NP-Attack-RZ is between NP-Attack-R and NP-Attack-Z.
Thus, in the following experiments, we only show the results of NP-Attack-R and
NP-Attack-Z to benchmark the upper and lower bound of our NP based attack.
Compared to ZOO, our NP-Attack-R can reduce the query count by 98.86%
and 99.95% on MNIST and CIFAR10 respectively under untargeted attack set-
ting, while for targeted attack, NP-Attack-R reduces the query count by 96.91%
and 99.74% on MNIST and CIFAR10. The comparison shows that though ZOO
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achieves 100% ASR, it is far from query efficient, requiring over 100,000 queries
to generate considerable adversarial examples, implying high costs in compu-
tation and time. When it comes to AutoZOOM, it could significantly reduce
the query count by proposing an adaptive random gradient estimation strat-
egy. AutoZOOM-BiLIN and AutoZOOM-AE leverage a simple bilinear resizer
or auto-encoder as the decoder respectively to reduce the dimension of adversar-
ial perturbations. AutoZOOM based method can attack the model successfully
with quite fewer initial success query counts, but the distortion is unacceptable
at initial success. It still requires much more queries to fine-tuning. Compared to
AutoZOOM, our NP-Attack methods outperform not only in query counts but
also in the L∞ distortion. QL utilizes NES algorithm to estimate the gradient,
thus the performance of such technique hinges on the quality of the estimated
gradient. QL shows its superiority in targeted attack for the reason that gradient-
based methods are easier to find the targeted direction. In contrast, NAttack
and our NP-Attack both utilize NES to estimate the adversarial distribution.
Compared to QL, our NP-Attack-R could achieve much better results in untar-
geted attack and comparable results in targeted attack. Compared to NAttack,
our NP-Attack could achieve higher ASRs and fewer query counts under both
targeted or untargeted settings, due to the outstanding distribution modeling ca-
pacity of the NP model. In general, NP-Attack obtains the best trade-off between
query counts and distortion. More experimental results on various architectures
are reported in Appendix D.
4.3 Evaluation on ImageNet
The dimension of the images in ImageNet is relatively larger, which requires
more queries to generate adversarial examples. We randomly select 100 correctly
classified images from the test set to perform untargeted and targeted black-box
attacks on ImageNet. For each image in targeted attack, a random label except
the true one out of 1000 classes is selected to serve as the target. The L∞
distortion is restricted to 0.05 following the setting of [13,14], T = 600, b = 100
and the learning rate η = 0.005. To improve the query efficiency on images with
large sizes, ZOO and AutoZOOM utilize the techniques such as hierarchical
attack and compressing dimension of attack space. For our NP-Attack, we also
perform such compression. To be specific, we resize the images to 32×32×3 to
train the NP model, then we add perturbations on each 32×32×3 patch, which is
cut independently from the original images. Although using the attack dimension
reduction, our NP-Attack method still outperforms.
The experimental results are summarized in Table 5. Due to the large image
sizes, ZOO suffers from low ASRs and tremendous model evaluations especially
for targeted attack. For other three compared attacks, they achieve 100% ASRs
at the cost of over 10,000 queries in targeted attack and over 1,000 queries in
untargeted attack. While for our NP-Attack, NP-Attack-R can achieve 100%
ASR with only 867 queries, yielding a 94.45% query reduction ratio compared
to ZOO in untargeted attack. In targeted attack, NP-Attack-R and NP-Attack-Z
get over 98% ASRs and reduce the query counts to 8,001 and 11,383 respectively,
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which exceed all the compared methods. This demonstrates that our NP-Attack
can scale to ImageNet set. The generated adversarial examples by NP-Attack-R
are shown in Appendix E.
Table 5. Adversarial evaluation of black-box attacks on ImageNet.
Attack Method
Untargeted Attack Targeted Attack
ASR L2 Dist Query Count ASR L2 Dist Query Count
ZOO 90% 1.20 15,631 78% 3.43 2.11x106
AutoZOOM-BiLIN 100% 9.34 3,024 100% 11.26 14,228
QL 100% 17.72 3,985 100% 17.39 33,360
NAttack 100% 24.01 2,075 100% 24.14 14,229
Bandits 100% – 1,165 100% – 25,341
NP-Attack-R(Ours) 100% 10.96 867 98.02% 14.38 8,001
NP-Attack-Z(Ours) 96.04% 12.37 1,236 98.02% 14.60 11,383
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on improving the query efficiency in black-box attack by
modeling the high-level distribution of adversarial examples. By considering the
structure information of pixels in one image rather than individual pixels, which
is realized by a decoder of benign pre-trained Neural Process model, we propose
the Neural Process-based black-box attack (NP-Attack) to greatly reduce the
required query complexity. Evaluated on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet with
regard to query count and attack success rate, our proposed NP-Attack achieves
the state-of-the-art results, showing its efficiency and superiority under the black-
box adversarial attack setting. Moreover, when pre-training the NP model on
adversarial image examples instead of benign examples, we believe the query
efficiency could be further improved, which is left for our future work.
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A The Structure of ANP in NP-Attack
Here, we show the detailed structure of the pre-trained ANP model on CIFAR10.
Table 6. Structure of the deterministic part of encoder h. (The input of Linear1
includes the pixel position: 3072 (32 × 32 × 3) × 3, the pixel value in RGB respectively:
3072 × 1, thus with a size of 3072 × 4 in total.)
Layer Input Output Activation function
Linear1 3072×4 3072×128 ReLU
Linear2 3072×128 3072×128 ReLU
Linear3 3072×128 3072×128 ReLU
SelfAtt 3072×128 3072×128 -
CrossAtt 3072×128 3072×128 -
Linear4 3072×128 3072×128 -
Table 7. Structure of the sampled latent part of encoder h.
Layer Input Output Activation function
Linear1 3072×4 3072×128 ReLU
Linear2 3072×128 3072×128 ReLU
Linear3 3072×128 3072×128 ReLU
SelfAtt 3072×128 3072×128 -
Mean 3072×128 3072×128 -
Linear4 3072×128 3072×128 -
Table 8. Structure of the latent part of decoder g. (The input of Linear1 includes the
deterministic path: 3072 × 128, the sampled latent path: 3072 × 128 and the target
pixel position: 3072 × 3, thus with a size of 3072 × 259 in total.)
Layer Input Output Activation function
Linear1 3072×259 3072×128 ReLU
Linear2 3072×128 3072×128 ReLU
Linear3 3072×128 3072×128 ReLU
Linear4 3072×128 3072×1 ReLU
B More Optimization Options of NP-Attack
Here we show the details of the other two optimization options, NP-Attack-Z
and NP-Attack-RZ.
NP-Attack-Z In this case, we fix r and optimize on the distribution of z,
in order to sample z with adversary. Under the guidance of score outputs in
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each query, to be simplified, we just optimize the predictive mean µ, keeping σ
fixed. The optimization of our NP-Attack is inherited from NES, which could
enhance query efficiency compared with those vector-wise gradient estimation
strategies. Omitting the fixed r while inheriting Decoder g from the pre-trained
NP, the estimated loss function in our NP-Attack could be considered as L =
EN (z|µ,σ2)l(g(z)). The optimization of µ is implemented by adding some random
Gaussian noises and further using NES to estimate the gradient. Those added
Gaussian noises are of the same variance with z in pre-trained NP. The reason
comes as that a same variance could keep z of a simpler representation for
variance after adjustment in each iteration, which benefits the optimization later.
The optimization function could be computed as: µt+1 ← µt − η∇µL |µt , where
η denotes a learning rate. To guarantee such optimization being more accurate,
in practice the optimization is over a mini-batch of sample size b, which means
we add b random perturbations independently during each iteration and operate
on those outputs. So the updating operation is on the average values instead:
µt+1 ← µt − η
b
b∑
i=1
l(g(zi))∇µt logN (zi | µi, σ2). (6)
Given that µi = µt + piσ, zi = µi + piσ = µt + 2piσ, where pi is sampled from
the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, I), and σ is multiplied to keep a simple
representation for variance, ∇µt logN (zi | µi, σ2) ∝ σ−1pi.
NP-Attack-RZ Similarly, we propose NP-Attack-RZ as a third choice by opti-
mizing both r and z simultaneously. The operation is the same with NP-Attack-
R/Z as shown in Algorithm 1.
C The Visual Comparison of Adversarial Examples by
Different NP-Attack Versions.
We show the adversarial examples generated by NP-Attack-R/Z/RZ in Figure
5. We observe that adversarial perturbations generated by NP-Attack-R are
centered around the main digits while perturbations generated by NP-Attack-
Z are scattered on the background. Furthermore, the location of adversarial
perturbations in NP-Attack-RZ is somehow in a moderate degree between NP-
Attack-R and NP-Attack-Z.
D Evaluation on Additional Architectures
We additionally do experiments under  = 0.031 on CIFAR-10 on various archi-
tectures including ResNet18 [12], VGG16 [24] and WideResNet [35]. We compare
NP-Attack-R with the state-of-the-art NAttack here and report the attack suc-
cess rate (ASR) and average queries in Table 9. We conduct untargeted attacks
with the same experimental setting of Section 4.2. The experimental results
demonstrated that our method still outperforms towards various architectures.
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Optimize R
Optimize Z
Optimize R&Z
Benign
Fig. 5. Adversarial examples of different optimization methods (NP-Attack-R/Z/RZ).
Table 9. Adversarial evaluation of untargeted black-box attacks on CIFAR-10 on
various architectures.
Attack Method
ASR Avg Queries
ResNet18 VGG16 WRN ResNet18 VGG16 WRN
NAttack 96.79% 100% 99.89% 311 430 335
NP-Attack-R(Ours) 100% 100% 100% 185 294 196
E The Generated Adversarial Examples on ImageNet by
NP-Attack
We show the adversarial examples generated by our NP-Attack-R here. It is
demonstrated that though we perturb each 32×32×3 patch in the original im-
ages, the perturbation generated by our method is still imperceptible.
Tench
Coho
Brittany spaniel
German short-haired 
pointer
Sundial
Wall clock
Fig. 6. Adversarial example of ImageNet generated by NP-Attack-R on untargeted
attack bounded by L∞=0.05. Top row shows the original images and the true labels
while the bottom row are the adversarial examples with predicted label.
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